By Mathias Hounkpe
On March 22, 2012, a mutiny by young soldiers and army officers led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo began in a camp in Kati, 15 km outside Bamako. To the amazement of many, it ended up as a coup that ousted the democratically-elected President Amadou Toumani Touré six weeks before democratic elections were due to be held. The coup took the international community by surprise as Mali had been erroneously regarded as a beacon of democracy in Africa.
The coup brought an end to Mali’s ‘democratization’ process and hastened the process that eventually led to an all-out conflict. Not too long after the coup, the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg separatist movement supported by Ansar al-Din – a group linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – AQIM, which had launched a rebellion against the Malian state in January 2012, benefited from the political uncertainty in the capital, and rapidly occupied almost two-thirds of Mali.
Overview of opposition groups
MNLA and Ansar al-Din were soon joined by two other groups – the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO in French) and AQIM. Ansar al-Din, MUJAO and AQIM all had religious objectives and their principal demand was the implementation of Shariah, or Islamic Law, in all or part of Mali and possibly the spread of their religious interpretation to large parts of West Africa. The MNLA, which originally launched the rebellion that led to the occupation of the north, was the only group whose publicly expressed objective was political as opposed to religious. It was seeking the independence of ‘Azawad’ – the name it gave to northern Mali. Yet the MNLA, wracked with internal division, shortages, and local populations hostile to its vision as well as the alleged crimes of some of its fighters, progressively lost space to the more powerful jihadist groups occupying the north.
Primary aim of national and international actors
Since the beginning of the conflict in Mali, the primary aim of many of the national and international actors has been the restoration of its territorial integrity and the return of constitutional order, which stipulates among other things an officially secular state. Unfortunately, divergent views between various parties, including pro- and anti-coup civil society groups, the military junta, the transitional government, other elements of Mali’s political class, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the international community, led to a deadlock and procrastination that prevented the adoption of a rapid strategy for the conclusion of the crisis. Inside Mali, particularly in the south, there were disagreements amongst civil society organizations, the political class, religious leadership (notably the High Islamic Council, or HCI), and the army.
Struggling to find consensus
There was no consensus among these groups on a number of issues, including the process leading to national dialogue, the role of the armed forces during the transition, the role of foreign forces in the re-conquest of the north, and the need to dialogue with some of the groups occupying the North. These discords led to a stalemate that made it impossible to define and adopt a clear roadmap for the way forward.
The local actors were not the only ones who failed to reach an agreement. International actors also struggled to find consensus. Within ECOWAS and the African Union, there were disagreements particularly on the role of the junta during the transition, the prioritization of military intervention or the need for dialogue with all or some of the rebels in the North. While the UN considered that “a military operation may be required as a last resort” and asked Mali’s political authorities to “put in place a credible framework for negotiations”, ECOWAS and the AU, as well as France, insisted on the urgency for military intervention and warned against the risks of protracted dialogue in Mali. The United States and the UN placed emphasis on the need to re-establish the legitimacy of the political authorities through an inclusive political dialogue and the holding of elections.
When all hope was lost and looked very unlikely that there would be any quick concerted regional or international action, Ansar al-Din made what now seems like a terrible miscalculation and attempted to move southward in conjunction with AQIM and MUJAO. Facing the prospect of losing the entire country and possibly the region, France launched the current intervention, in the process garnering international support and galvanizing the deployment of ECOWAS forces and troops from Chad alongside elements of the Malian army.
And after the French leave...?
Since the start of the intervention, significant progress has been made in reclaiming territory. Gao, Timbucktu, Kidal all quickly fell to Malian and French troops with only limited resistance. However, it would be a tremendous mistake to conclude that the crisis in Mali will soon be over. The country still faces enormous challenges. The swift military progress so far has been largely as a result of the French role, but the French government has made it clear that they do not intend to hang around for very long. Most of the African forces in Mali found themselves deployed well ahead of schedule, without the necessary training and preparation. This will almost certainly have consequences on the quality of their contribution to the operation, especially in the harsh environment of northern Mali. Also missing is the necessary coordination among troops from different countries especially troops from outside West Africa, e.g. Chad and coordination between Anglophone and Francophone troops.
Widespread security risks & displaced populations
The operation to reclaim northern Mali poses risk for security in the Sahel and the sub-region as a whole. Most of the Sahel is a sparsely-populated and difficult-to-police desert, and the rebels seem to have abandoned the towns in northern Mali and headed into this zone. Due to the porous nature of borders in the region, they could lie dormant until the transient international attention wanes and reappear in Mali or work with other terrorist groups to launch attacks in other parts of West Africa, such as Nigeria. The terrorist attack on the In Amenas Gas plant in Algeria just weeks ago clearly illustrates this problem.
Current estimates indicate that close to 250,000 Malians are internally displaced and about 145,000 have sought refuge in neighbouring countries. This humanitarian crisis is already having immense impact on many of Mali’s neighbours who are already grappling with their own declining economic conditions. Providing the IDPs and refugees with humanitarian aid will be an absolute necessity in the coming months until they can be repatriated.
Political challenges, post-conflict
With regards to the political dimension, post-conflict Mali will also face several important challenges even after the north is liberated and Malian state authority restored. These include the need to hold free and fair elections and the reestablishment of constitutional order. Several obstacles will, however, need to be overcome for this to happen. There is a need to set up a credible election management body with the support of all factions, including the media and CSOs. New voter registers including displaced persons and refugees need to be developed. Another key issue to be addressed is the role of the former junta in the transition process. Capt. Sanogo continues to wield significant powers behind the scenes, though the intervention seems to have temporarily undercut some of his influence. There is a need to ensure that the elections are truly democratic, and this may mean limiting some of these powers to create a level playing field.
Rebuilding the military & security forces
There is also the difficult task of rebuilding Mali’s military and security forces. The rebellion in the North as well as the 22 March 2012 military coup have created distrust and hostility among already degraded security forces, particularly between components of the defense forces. There have been reports of abuses committed against the 33rd Parachute Regiment, the famous “Berets Rouges”, after they purportedly attempted a countercoup against the junta in early April. The relationship between the military and civilians will also need to be rebuilt. Some soldiers from the North joined the rebellion and some of the soldiers in the South have been accused of human rights violations. The international community, particularly France, has a key role to play in ensuring that the Malian armed forces do not engage in retaliatory attacks against civilian populations, and particularly Tuareg and Arabs, in the north.
Addressing political grievances in the North
Perhaps the most difficult challenge Mali faces is addressing the political grievances of the northern populations, including Tuareg and Arabs. On the one hand, it is vital that Malians in both the north and south come to an agreement about the future of the Malian state. Many northerners believe that they have for decades been deprived of development and access to resources. They also feel oppressed or manipulated by the Bamako government. Yet there is also little appetite for concession in the South. As long as this continues Mali will remain a deeply divided country. There is a need for the country to have a genuinely national truth and reconciliation process to address some of the deep wounds that continue to divide the country. Building and rebuilding social and national cohesion will be crucial if there will be no further relapse into the recent crisis. It is a multi-ethnic country comprising blacks, Tuaregs and Arabs and there is a need for them to see themselves as Malians first and make their ethnicity secondary.
In 1992, a National Pact was signed between the Malian government and northern rebel factions, calling for decentralization, reconciliation and bringing resources and development to some of the country’s most isolated regions. There is a need for this pact to be revisited and its terms revised and implemented where appropriate. Without this, Mali will continue to see a recurrence of rebellions, revolts and coups.
Mathias Hounkpe is OSIWA's Political Governance Officer and head of OSIWA Guinea country office.
