By Abdul Tejan-Cole
A year ago, Mali was a mess. Just a few days to a presidential election to replace Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) the country’s military deposed his government. The March 21 2012 coup brought to power the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), headed by then Captain Amadou Sanogo. The justification for the coup, according to the junta, was that the government of ATT was incompetent, corrupt and failed to provide the army with adequate weapons and personnel to defeat the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), a Tuareg separatist movement that worked alongside Ansar al-Din, a group linked to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), operating in the north of the country. Sanogo’s time in charge was short-lived. On 7th April, as part of a deal sponsored by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), he stepped down. Technically, constitutional order was restored. ATT officially resigned the presidency, paving the way for the president of the national assembly, Dioncounda Traoré, to act as interim president in accordance with the Constitution. As the chaos in Bamako continued, the MNLA, Ansar al-Din, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and AQIM, took advantage of the breach in authority to make gains and advance southward, taking control of key cities including Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. On April 6, the MNLA declared an independent “Azawad” state in northern Mali, and soon announced a transitional cabinet even as jihadist groups took up key positions in the main cities in the north. After months of ineffectual negotiations and stalemate, when it looked very unlikely that there would not be any concerted regional or international action to liberate northern Mali, Ansar al-Din made what now seems like a terrible miscalculation and attempted to push deeper into central Mali, moving toward Mopti and a key military base at Sevaré. Facing the prospect of losing the entire country and possibly the region, and worried that Mali would become an even more fertile ground for the training and recruitment of terrorists, international actors, mainly France, got their act together and launched a military intervention. Most of the territory claimed by the rebels was swiftly retaken with little or no resistance. Eager to leave, international actors pushed for and successfully held two rounds of presidential elections. The first, held on July 28, 2013, was contested by over 25 candidates. Former Prime Minister and parliamentary Speaker, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (known in Mali and in the subregion as IBK) and his Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM) party won 39.23% beating former Finance Minister and Secretary General of the Presidency, Soumaïla Cissé, into second place with 19.44. The expected strong challenge of Dramane Dembélé and his Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali (Adema) party failed to materialize as they garnered less than 10% of the vote. In the second round, IBK trounced Cisse winning a resounding 77.61% to Cisse’s 22.39%. To his credit, Cisse, who was at one time the head of the Commission of the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), conceded defeat and visited IBK to congratulate him on his victory. Despite the many short-comings of the elections, many observers gave it a clean bill of health. On September 19th, in the presence of the presidents of Ghana, Nigeria and France amongst others, IBK was inaugurated as President of Mali and commenced his five year mandate. But winning the election was the easy part. IBK now faces a daunting task to address the myriad of challenges that Mali faces. In the past week, there were reports of Malian soldiers and MNLA fighters openly exchanging gunfire, continued skirmishes near the Mauritanian border and disputed stories that a suicide bomber was killed when he accidentally detonated his explosives belt. To compound matters, the MNLA, Arab Movement Azawad (MAA) and High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) announced that they were pulling out of negotiation agreed to in the June 18 Ouagadougou agreement (Preliminary Agreement to the Presidential Election and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali) under which the transitional government of Dioncounda Traoré agreed with the MNLA to set a 60-day deadline after the establishment of the new government for the opening negotiations. At the heart of these negotiations would have been the political grievances of northern populations, including Tuareg and Arabs. Many northerners believe that they have for decades been deprived of development and access to resources, even though many, including Tuaregs and Arabs, did not support the rebellion. Some feel oppressed and manipulated by the Bamako government in the South. At the same time, even before the dissolution of the Ouagadougou Accords there was little appetite for concession in the South. As long as this continues Mali will remain a deeply divided country. There is a need for a genuinely national truth and reconciliation process to address some of the deep wounds that continue to divide the country. Building social and national cohesion will be crucial to prevent further relapse of the crisis. The existing Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission (DRC) falls short in many regards and may need to be reconstituted if genuine reconciliation is to be addressed. Mali is a multi-ethnic country and there is a need for them to see themselves as Malians first and make their ethnicity secondary. In 1992, a National Pact was signed between the Malian government and largely Tuareg and Arab rebels, calling for decentralization, reconciliation and bringing resources and development to some of the country’s most isolated regions. There is a need for this pact to be revisited and its terms implemented. Without this, Mali will continue to see a recurrence of rebellions, revolts and coups. Linked to security and reconciliation, is the issue of managing Sanogo and the Malian military. Just after the elections, interim President Traore promoted Sango to the rank of four-star general. This promotion was roundly criticized by civil society and human rights groups. The reality however was that even though Sanogo handed over power in April 2012, he continued to wield immense power behind the scene. His powers may be waning but IBK needs to continue to keep a close eye on him and deal with the thorny issue of security sector reform. The Malian army was for several decades rotted by institutional corruption and clientelism. It will have to purge from its ranks the many senior officers who committed human rights abuses during the conflict. It requires training to ensure it does not repeat the violations of human rights and humanitarian law it has been accused of committing in the past. It also requires uniforms, equipment and new stock of weapons. A key challenge IBK promised to address during his campaign is corruption. During the tenure of ATT, corruption pervaded nearly every facet of Malian government. Mali performed poorly in terms of control of corruption as shown by its Corruption Perceptions Index and World Bank Governance indicators’ scores. In addition, there were serious allegations that some senior members of ATT’s government and their families were involved in and benefitted from the trafficking of drugs from South America and elsewhere. Even IBK was accused of lavish-spending during his days as Prime Minister. As President, he will need to keep to his campaign promises and bring “the axes out” to fight corruption. He has started well. His appointment of Oumar Tatam Ly as Prime Minister augurs well. The 49-year-old Ly is a political novice who has been given a huge task of ending Mali’s endemic corruption. Prior to his appointment he was adviser to the Governor of the Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) and before then he was at the World Bank. His lack of experience may be a weakness but is also an opportunity for the new broom to sweep clean. As donors continue to commit funds to the rebuilding of Mali, Ly is the man tasked by IBK to tackle Mali’s endemic corruption, deliver essential services and bring about a meaningful change in the lives of ordinary Malians. For the sake of Mali and West Africa, I pray he succeeds. © Politico 03/10/13
